Abstract: Criticism of nuclear weapons policies often misses the target through ignorance of the policles thot ore oct uolly in effect. This essay recounts the development of American nucleor weapons policies, tagether with a history of the criticisms of these policies presented by nuclear strategists ond moral philosophers.
1. lntroduction wish in this article to describe the American debate about nucleor weapons os it developed from 1945 down to the presen t doy. Since the subject is vast, my description con be no more thon a sketch. But after eoch sect ion, I indicate fur t her readings for those who moy wish to probe more deeply into a particulor topic.
The Americon 'debote' obout nucleor weopons policies is octuolly t wo separate debates. There is a debate, conducted prlncipally by politicol Ieaders and academic sociol scientists, about the rotionality of different n ucleor weopons policies, i. e. obou t whether or not o porticulor policy serves the in terests of the United Stotes. Secondly, there is a debate, conducted principolly by p r ivate citizens, academic philosophers, ond religious Ieaders, obout the morolity of different nucleor weopons policies, i .e. obout whether or not o porticulor policy is sonctioned by morol principles. In what follows I consider both the strategic debate ond the morol debote. 8oth the strotegic debote ond the morol debote hove been morred by intellectuol confusion and orgument at cross purposes. The debo te about rotionolit y is often confused becouse different groups have differe n t ideas obout whot constit utes the 'interests' af the United States. One group, who might be colled 'realists', define the American national interest norrowly, os con sisting of the physicol sofety, politicol independence, ond material well-being of the Americon people. Another group, the 'ideologues', define the Americon interest os consis ting of safety, independence, and well-being ~ the mointenonce of Americon influence in the world at !arge, where the mointenonce of Americon influence includes the protection of American economic interests, the support of regimes favorable to the United Stotes, ond the undermining of Communist regimes or regimes fovoring the Soviet bloc. Obviously, the different definitions of 'interest' often yield different recommendations about which cour se of oction is rational from the American point of view.
The debote obout the morality of different nucleor weapons policies has been eve n more confu sed thon the debate obout rationolity. Not only do different groups in the debote s ubscribe to differe nt ond conflicting morol codes , there is also consideroble conscious ond unconscious disogreement obout the correct morol methodology to be opplied to this problem. As regords morol codes, the principol dlvisions ore between (o) utilitorion morolists, who evoluote policies occording to their estimoted effects on t he welfare of monkind, (b ) de-ontologicol morolists, who evoluote policies occording to o code of forbldden octs or mondoted duties, (c) justice-oriented morolists, who evoluote policles occording to generot principles of ju s tice ond foirness, ond (d ) sociol controct theorists, who evoluote policies occording to principles explicitly or implicitly consented to by the porties whose interests ore ot stake.
As re gords morol methodology, the principol differences ore between (o ) those who cons ider oll morol beliefs to be inhe rently undemonstroble or ' s ubjective', whether applied to private conduct, or international relotion s, (b) those who consider morol principles to be genuinely opplicoble to personal conduct but inoppropriote when opplied to the octions of notion-stotes, ond (c) those who believe thot the demonds of morolity ore equolly opplicoble to the octions of lndividuols ond the policies of notion-stotes.
There is also o deep methodologicol gop betwee n those who feel thot the proper object of morol judgement is the Intention with which an individual performs an oction, and those who feel thot the proper object of morol judgement ore the effects which the oction to be judged will hove upon the world.
Given oll these disogreements obout boslc principles, it is not surpr1smg thot the debote obout nucleor weopons policies presents o chootic oppeoronce, full of rhetorlc ond repetition. As o philosopher, the choos offends me. But in this historicol essoy, I must leove it in, since this is how thlngs octuolly tronspired. (New Hoven/Conn. 1985) , also by J.T. Johnson.
Prelude
Since nucleor weopons were first used in the course of American terror bombing ogoinst Japan, a good starting point for the considerat ion of nucleor weopons policy is the bombing compaign s of the Secend World War.
As is well-known, ofter a brief ottempt at precision bombing in 1940, the Royal Air Force Bomber Corrmond shifted to a policy of nighttime orea bombing of German territory. Not only did Churchill and Arthur Harris, the head of Bomber Command, know that t he shift to area bombing would cause great numbers of civilian casualties in Ger mony, the deoths of Germon civilians wer e also an intended gool of British policy, on the (dubious) ossumption thot such ottocks would breok Germon morole ond moke the Germon government more inclined to surrender. Though most of the British people supported the policy of oreo bombing, perhops on the principle thot it was fair to do to Germony whot 'Germony' hod done to them, o number of British religio us Ieaders ond other private citlzens spoke out ogoinst the Churchill-Horris policy, or guing thot the intentional killing of noncombotonts was controry to the principles of just war ond morolly indistinguishoble from murder.
In the United Stotes, little public or private criticism was voiced obout British oreo bombing, perhops becouse Americons feit thot British bombing policy was not their business. Nevertheless, when the Americon Army Air Force joined the British bombing compoign in 1942, Americon policy, fortified by possession of superior planes ond more occurote bombsights, rejected British-style oreo bombing in fovor of precision bombing in doytime. Americon bomblng roids, of course, killed !arge numbers of Germon eivilians. But American bombing killed fewer civilians per bomb than Britisch ombing, and it was not the intention of American bornbin policy to kill German eivilians, nor was it the intention of America·n policy to crack German morale through wholesale destruction of residential areas. Given the relative moral superiority of America policy, there was in the United Stetes no critieism of American bombing policy against Germany, except from outright paeifists who rejected war in general.
would be avoiloble by the surrrner of 1945, scientists on the project div ided into (o) o smol minority who feit thot the bomb should not be used ot oll, (b) o slight minority who feit thot a 'demonstration' bombing of an uninhobited oreo should precede ony use ogoinst o Joponese city, ond (c) o substontiol minority who feit thot the bomb should be used agoinst o Joponese city, just os incendiory bombs hod been used since 1944. Those who opposed ony use ot oll orgued thot the use of otomic energy in wartime would ' set o bad precedent for post-war development of otomic energ y, which would be cente red on militory opplicatlons. The end result would be militory control of bosic scientific reseorch. Those who fovored o demonstrotion bombing orgued thot the mossocre of civilions in o city ottock would be immorol since the octuol bombing of o city was not in foct needed to induce surren der. But the sclentific director on the otomic project, Robert Oppenheimer, rejected the proposol for o demonstrotion bombing, on the g r ounds thot the demonstrotion might not work, thot the explosion might not impress, ond thot the stock of Americon otomic bombs was too smoll to woste ony on demonstrotions.
ln the end, Trumon occepted Oppenheimer's recorrrnendotions, ond 120,000 people died ot Hiroshimo, 80,000 more ot Nogosoki. The mojority of Americon s, then ond now, believed thot the two otomic ottock s we r e morolly justified, either becouse they believed thot ony ottock is justified ogoin st o notion thot hos ottocked fir st, or becou se they believed that ending the war by otomic bombing was morolly better thon ending the war by o land Invasion of Japan thot would kill more Joponese thon were killed in the otomic roids. Despite the widesp r ead feeling that the Hiroshima bombing was justified, both morall y and strotegically, there was, in t he irrmediate postwar period, a generat revu lsion in the United States with area bombing in generat and atomic bombing in particular. Shown pictures of the effects at Hiroshimo, T ruman erdered that the third atomic bomb not be ossembled, since some alternative had to be found to "k illing oll those kids ". The horrors of Hiroshimo were widely publicized in a series of articles by John Hersey pu blished in the New Yorker mogazine, a nd news reports from occupied Japan abou t the devastation wrou ght by American incendiary raids made a considerable Impression on the Ame rican public. From 1946 to the present, the dominant moral theme in discussions of nuclear weapons has been that typical uses of these weapons involve the slaughter of the innocent. The deepening American sense of war guilt was abetted, in 1946, by the publication of the Air Force's own 'Strategie Bombing Survey', which r eported t hat area bombing in t he recent war had been much less militory effective than prec•s•on bombing, and consequently thot hundreds of thouson ds of civilians killed in American ond British area bombing raids had , by and !ar ge, been mossacred for no discernoble militory advantage.
Thus t he generat post-war feeling -that there should be no more warwas conjoined with the particular sentiments that area bombing should be ovoided and that atomic weopons should be abolished. By March 1946, Robert Oppenheimer and Dovid Lilienthal, with the sanction of the American State Department, had proposed the abolition of atomic weopons through the estoblishment of an International Atomic Ene rgy Authority empowered to monitor and control oll t he fi ssienoble material in the world. Since no one under t his system could have the moterials with which to make bombs, no bombs would be produced, even if wars between nations would contin ue to occur. A ve rs ion of t his plan was presented by Bernard Bor uch to the United Nations in June 1946, where it failed to gain acceptance by the Eastern bloc, because (the Americans said ) , it r equired the Soviets to give up hopes of militory domination through development of their own atomic weapons, or because ( t he Soviets said ) it required oll the world's nations to give up their fissienoble material before the Americans gave u p thei r bomb s . 1945 -1960 ', in: International Security 7,4 (Spring 1983 1982) .
Though they mode little impressjon on Trumon, the Novy protests of 1949 were not lost on the community of Americon otomic scientists. Mony of them were oppolled by the ideo of further Hiroshimos, ond mony of them, ot some risk to their coreers, hod opposed the decision to proceed with the hydrogen bomb. Convinced (reluctontly) thot the U.N. was not going to obolish war, ond repulsed by the ideo of using otomic bombs ogoinst cities, some morolly oriented scientists set t hemselves the tosk of developing smoll scole nucleor weopons, the uses of which could beor some resemblonce to troditionol non -terroristie uses of weopons of war. In short order, Project Vista, o crosh Koreon war reseorch progrom, developed the otomic connon, the otomic mortor, ond the otomic mine. None of these were used in the Koreon war, but they were groduolly insinuoted into NATO or senals os o cou nterweig ht to the s u perior monpower of the War sow Poet. Kissinger's suggested route out of the Americon strotegie imposse was to negotiote ogreeme nts for nucleor free zones in Europe ond for the bilateral restriction of nucleor weopons to worheods of a ( relotively) limited size. In succeeding yeors, o host of Kissinger style suggestions for limiting nucleor war in Europe hove been proposed, but oll of them hove founde red on scientifie estimotes thot such limited nucleor wors, even if they remoined limited, would couse severol million civilion cosuolties .
In the lote 1950's it become deorer thot o first use of lorge scole nucleor weopons ogoinst o nucleor power would be suicidol. Strategists debo ted whether there was ony rational use left for lorge scole nucleor weopons, and a consensus began to emerge that even if it were suieidal to use lo rge nuclear weapons first, it still might be rational to use them in resp on se to a nuclear attack. At least it might be rational to threaten to s trike back with nucleo r weopons, since the threot to strike back would, against a rational opponent, prevent nuclear attacks from occu rr ing in the first place. Slowly, Ameriean strategic forces were shifted from a posture in which they would need be used first to a posture in which they would probably be used secend. Obviously, if nuclear forces are to be used second, they must be capable of survlving nuclear ottock, ond the search for survivoble 'basing modes' begon. Finding its bombers pote ntially vu lnerable to nucleor sneak attocks, t he Strategie Air Commond began pulling its bombe r s back from over seos bases to sofer positions in the continentol U.S.
But if it was sofer to place bomber s far awoy from potential enemies rather thon close to them, it was clear that no oir bose could be completely sofe from pre-emptive nuclear ottock. The Novy o rgued in 1958 that nucleor s ubmarines ot seo were more likely to su rvive o nucleor ottack on the United Stetes thon ony oir bose, ond t hot bollistic missiles launched from nucleor submarines were more likely to reoch their targets thon subsonie strategie bombers. Navy advocates like Admiral Arleigh Burke went so far os to or gue thot oll Ameriean strotegic n ucleor forces should be shifted from t he Air Force to the Novy, ond thot the o r elotively smoll number of nucleor submarines was oll the United Stotes needed to deter nucleor attock s with credible t hreats of Ame rican counterottock. The Air Force respanded to Burke's system of 'Mi nimum Deterrence' with the observotion that anly strategic bombers could bomb the Soviet Un ion with ony preclslan, t aking out militory torgets ond sporing eitles. T h us the debate between the Air Force ond the Novy in 1958 was exoctly the re verse of the debote between the Air Force and the Navy in 1949. As before, the Navy lost the argument, and the Air Force en ded up with two-thirds of the Ameriean 'strotegie triad': nucleor bombers ond land based missiles. The Novy was left with submarine lounched bollistic missiles.
By 1959, strategie thinking obou t nuclear weapons was almest entirely focused an the problern of an American secend str ike. The initiol thought obou t o secend strike was thot a secend strike should be a s massive as possible, but the subsequent thought was thot a secend strike should rou g hly mirnie the size of the enemy's first strike. Furthermore, it was clear to some that ony nucleor ottock an the United Stotes thot spared Amerieon eitles shou ld not produce an American ottack on Soviet eitles, since thot ottock might indeed provoke o Soviet ottack on American eitles, whieh hod thus far been spor ed. Strategists at the RAND corporation in Santa Monieo, California, began to develop new and secret war plans which would provide the President, should he choose to use strotegie nuclear weapons, with more options thon the single massive strike provided by the Mos si ve Retoliotion plan s in force in the lote 1950's.
Most of the RAND discussions of nucleor war remoined clossified, but the public got some inkling of the sorts of things thot were being discussed ot RAND in the 1950's when Hermon Kahn, o RAND strotegist, published his morrmoth treotise, On Thermonucleor War in 1960. Bernord Brodle ITOd already token issue with the corrmonly occepted notion thot every use of nucleor weopons between the superpowers must consist of o tremendous sposm in which both side dischorged the bulk of their nucleor orsenols. In his book, Kahn developed dozens of different seenarios for different types of nucleor wors, confidently expressing the belief thot nucleo r wor s could begin on o limited scole ond remoin on o limited scole. Furthermore, even in the cose of lorge scole nucleor wors, Kahn orgued thot the recovery period ofter the war might be short: with proper preporotions, Kahn thought, the United Stotes could recover from o !arge scole nucleor ottock in os little os 35 yeors . Strotegicolly, Kohn's stressed thot the United Stotes must not become porolyzed through feor of storting o nucleor war; tho t the notion must prepore to fight, Iimit, ond recover from nucleor wors. Kohn's views were widely dissemi noted bu t few were persuoded by them. On the controry, Kohn's views ond writing style generolly te rr ified his r eoders, ond led them to reject his recommendotions obout war Iimitation ond civil defense. The notion of preporing to fight ond 'win' nucleor wors did not enter the moinstreom of Americon politicol thinking in the United Stotes until the orrivol of the Reogon odministrotion in 1981.
Mony of the strotegic problems offecting the use of !arge scole nucleor weopons offected smoll scole nucleor weopons os weil. By the lote 1950's, NATO forces possessed !arge numbers of tocticol nucleor weopons, but it was hord to orgue thot these provide o genuine militory odvontoge if the other side possessed them os weil, ond if the likely ploce for the e xplosion of those weopons was friendly territory. The remedy proposed by o number of strotegis ts was o to roise the· 'threshold' for the use of nucleor weopons, while s ubstontiolly increosing expenditures for conventionol forces. These proposols, requiring !arge increose in militory budgets, fell on deof eors in Europe, ond the theory behind them never did exploin how o serious conventionol war between nucleor powers could remoin conventionol when the losing porty could turn to nucleor weopons in hopes of lost minute victory. In the United Stotes, proposals for substontiol increoses in conventionol orms were stolled by Eisenhower's dislike of budget defici t s. But in the United Stotes in the eorly 1960's, reosoning olong these lines led to the developmen t of non -nucleor 'Special Forces' ond, eventuolly, to war in Vietnam. 11 This is o morol troct on moss murder: how to plan it; how ta commit it; haw ta get owoy with it; how to justify it." A mojar collec tion of articles expressing the opposition af s trotegis t s ond politicol scientists to Massive Retoliotian circa 1960 is Danald Brennen, Arms Contra!, Disormoment, ond National Security (New Yark 1961).
Moral Criticisms of Massive Retaliotion
Though the detoils of Americon nucleor wor-fighting plons in the. 1950's were top secret, their generot feotures could be inferred from an exominotion of Americon weopons ond o survey of the stotements of John Foster Du lies. By lote 1954, morol criticism of the direction of Americon (ond Soviet) nucleor weopons policy begon to be voiced, for exomple, in o Christrnos 1954 radio messoge by Bertrond Russell ond in o document, signed by Russell, Albert Einstein ond others scientific luminories.
The first wove of criticisms centered an the notion of nucleor war os an Instrument of policy. Stressing the immense darnage expectoble from nucleor war, Russell ond others orgued thot no goin from the stondpoint. of national interest could compensote for the Iosses suffered by monkind os o resu lt of nucleor war. The discovery of rodiooctive fellout ond its effects drove harne the point thot nucleor wors could injure future generotions ond man y come to believe thot whotever notion ( if an y) won o n ucleor war, mankind ot !arge would be the loser. The threot of nucleor weopons to mankind ot !arge demanded, mare t hon ever before, thot notions resolve their differences by peoceful meons. Furthermare, the gross irrmorolity of using nucleor weopon s demanded, some orgued, thot notions thot possess them simply give them up, even if their potential enemies did not follow suit. In 1960 the Un ited Stotes lounched the first nucleor bollistic missile submarine, ond eoch nucleor power begon to issue onnouncements, or ot least lnnuendoes, thot it dld not intend to use strotegic nucleor weopons first, but thot lt was prepored to use them second, in response to o nucleor ottock. Beginning in the lote 1950's, then, marol onalys ts begon to turn their ottention to the problern of the marol permissibility of secend strike th reots. These th reots, os the p hilosop h y of mossi ve retoliotion dictoted, were rightly presumed to be threots of massive secend strikes .
One point on which many of the marol critics ogreed was thot, if deterrence foiled, it would not be morolly permissible to lounch o secend strike . The whole point of threotening o secen d strike is to prevent o first strike; if the fir st strike occu r s, the secend strike serves no pupose besides useless revenge . But, if it was not morolly permissible to lounch o nucleor second strike, was it morolly permissible to threoten to lounch such o strike?
Mony thinkers who onolyzed this problern in the eorly 1960's concluded thot if second s trikes were not morolly occeptoble then threots to lounch secend strikes were not morolly occe ptoble either. In Englond, professionol philosophers like G.E.M. Anscombe, the eminent logiclon Peter Geoch, ond Anthony Kenny, oll orgued thot if X is an evil oct, then forming an the Intention to do X must also be evil. From this it followed thot if it is Irrmoral to lounch o nucleor secend strike, it must also be Irrmoral to intend to lounch such o strike. Now, since the philosophers oll ogreed thot launehing o secend strike would be immorol, they ogreed thot threotening to launch o second strlke must also be irrrnorol. Nucleor deterrence, like nucleor war, s tood morolly condemned.
In the United Stotes, the Cotholics divided on the morol occe ptobility of deterrence, but the prominent moral t heologion, John Courtney Murroy, condemned Massive Retoliotion in the influentiol orticle, Theology ond Modern War, published in 1959. By for the most penetrating critique of second strike threots of the 'massive retoliotion' variety come from the Protestant ethicist Poul Romsey, in his War ond Christion Conscience, published in 1961. Like the British philosophers, Romsey concentrated his ottention on the Intention to lounch o second strike ogoinst Soviet eitles in response to o Soviet first strike ogoinst the United Stotes. Such on oct, Romsey wrote, (p. 170) "would be the most unloving oct in the histor y of monkind", violoting stondords of proportionolity ond discriminotion developed over centuries in the theory of just war. But if the second strike is unloving, the threot to issue such o strike must be unloving os weil. As Romsey ond mony others pointed out in these years, o threot to kill Soviet civilions in order to prevent an ottock on oneself uses other human beings os meons, controry to the morol ru le thot people should alwoys be treoted os ends in themselves. The use of people outside the United Stotes to secure the sofety of Americons, mony orgued, is like se1ztng hostoges in order to secure some gool. But Romsey orgued thot it is olwoys immorol to seize hostoges, even for the purpose of soving innocent life. lf smoll bobies were tied on the bumpers of automobile, people would drive more corefully ond, on bolonce, the greoter number of innocent Jives would be soved. But thot would not mok e it morolly permissible to tie bobies on to the bumpers of automobiles. 
McNomoro ond Flexible Response
T·he Kennedy odministration orrived in the White Hause in 1961 determined to rectify the flows in Massive Retoliotion -ot least the strategic flow s . Secr etory of Defense McNomoro set Doniel Ellsberg ond others to rewriting the Eisenhower SIOP, ond the new plan was ready by the end of the yeor. The new plan, nomed SIOP 63 for its yeor of octivotion, reploced the single strotegic option of the eorlier SIOP with groduoted options for the use of nuclear weopons, from a strike agoinst enemy strategic nucleor weapons (and nothing else) to o strike ogoinst enemy military forces, strike against support facilities, a strike against economic and industriol targets, and a strike against enemy eitles. Targeting plans were r evised to connect each option with o differentiated g roup of targets, although a complete separation of targets for each attack option proved to be technically impossible. The strategy behind the new attack plons was called 'Flexible Response'. When McNomara sketched the plan in a public address at Ann Arbor, Michigan in June 1962, he mentioned the eorlier attack options while neglecting to mention the later ones: "The U. S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in a possible generat nuclea r war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the post. That is to say, principol military objectives, in t he event of a nuclear war steiTYTiing from a mojor attack an the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy' s military forces, not of his civilian population."
Most strategists believed that McNamara's SIOP provided the United States with a more credible form of deterrence than massive Retaliation had provided. In the event of a less-than-total strike against the United States, McNamora's SIOP provided for a less-than-total response, and mony feit that o less-thon -total response was a more rational ond therefore more likely response t han Massive Retaliatlon. Other s feit thot McNamara's plons still had not solved the centrat puzzle of nuclear deterrence. Even with the 'flexible' second strikes of the McNomara S IOP, nuclear second strikes in almost oll eircumstances would still be suicidal for the United States. A threat to launch a second strike, therefore, was a threat to commit suieide, and some s t rategists feit t hat threats to commit suicide were still incredible th r eots.
In his Ann Arbor address, McNomara mode it appeor that the United States had given up its Intention to deter a Soviet attack on 'the United States by planning to launch a nuclear counterattack against Soviet eitles. The truth was that the United States had only given up its plan to attack Soviet eitles in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack that spared American eitles. It s till planned to a ttack Soviet eitles after a Soviet attack that hit Americon eitles. Nevertheless, mony critics accepted McNamora's 'no eities' announcement at face value and had concluded that the United States had shifted, in oll of its s trategic targeting, from the 'countervalue' pattern of nuclear torgeting (assoeiated with Massive Retoliation) to a new pattern of 'counterforce' targeting (assoeiated with Flexible Response). Some moral analysts began to debate whether the new strategy (as it was construed) removed the moral objections that had been raised against Massive Retaliation .
Ramsey was confident that McNamara and his team had indeed remaved most of the problems. ln Ramsey's view, under Flexible Response, innocent people in the Soviet Union (ond elsewhere) were no Ionger held as hostoges to Americon strotegic weopons. True, if the United Stetes used its nuclear weopons to launch o counte rottack, many innocent people in the Soviet Union would die. But by Ramsey's standords the deoths of people thot would result from an Americon counterforce nucleor attack were sideeffects that fell outside the Intentions of the plan. The deaths of Soviet civilian s in an American nuclear attock, under Flexible Response, were reg rettable concomitonts of o necessary policy of national self-defense: creating risks for civilians was no Ionger the means by which the United Stetes sought to obtoin its security. Just War theory, Ramsey feit, could talerate deterrence in this form.
Other maral phllosophers who subscribed to the some moral principles as Ramsey were not so sure that nucleor deterrence hod suddenly become morolly respectable. After oll, if the Soviet Union did ottock the United Stetes, it would still be o bad idea for the United Stetes to launch a nuclear counter ottock -even o limited counterottack becouse mony innocent people would die in such an ottack, ond the gain to the United Stotes from a limited counterattack would probobly be slight: it might deter further ottocks, but then agoin it might provoke further ottocks. When the British Catholic philosopher Anthony Kenny onolysed the permi ssibility of n uclear deterrence in 1965, he still fou nd that a n uclear second strike, even o cou nterforce second s trike, would be an immarol oction. Kenny p r oceeded to orgue that if counterforce second strike were immoral, t he Intention to lounch counterforce second s t rikes must be immaral os weil. 
Arms Races and Arms Control
The rapid development of American strategic forces 1 principally in the form of strategic bomber s and hydrogen bombs 1 was challenged by the development of the hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union and by the Soviet introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles in 1957. Though the United Stetes had in these years a substantial Iead in s trategic forces 1 a number of strategic thinkers in 1957 began to question the wisdom of indefinite expansion in strategic arsenals. The s urprisingly rapid development of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and the orbiting of Sputnik made it obvious 1 at least to some 1 that the United Stetes could not expect to maintein any permanent Iead in nuclear weapons technology. It was also obvious that the Uni t ed Stetes could not maintain any permanent Iead in numbers of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons launchers. But lf no Iead in quality or quontity could be maintoined 1 what was t he point of acquiring more and more weapons? In these circumstances 1 many orgued 1 the sole reason to acquire new weapons would be to secure secend strike capacity -the ability to counterattack in the event of a first strike. The Navy had pointed out as early as 1958 t hat secend strike capacity could be secu red agains t massive strikes with a small fleet of nuclear submarines. For some 1 simple budgetary considerotions argued that the United Stetes should forgo the acquisltion of any weapons beyend the invulnerable minimum needed for secend strike.
I have already described how the Navy's scheme for Minimum Deterrence was politically sabotaged by the American Air Force. But in 1961 1 deman ds for Minimum Deterrence and efforts at arms control were equally undercut when McNamara instolled the new doctrine of Flexible Response. SIOP 63's multiplication of ottack options and the targeting of weil defended military facilities requi r ed substan tial increases in bot h the size and quality of American strategic forces. McNamara malntained the American B-52 bomber fleet 1 built up the Minuteman ICBM force from 0 to 1000 and increased t he American force of submarine launched ballistic missiles to 656. Mony analysts wendered whe t her these vast increases in nucleor weaponry were really necessary 1 even if part of the rationale for these increases in weapons was an attempt to ovoid ottacks on Soviet eitles. McNamara attempted to justify the increases in 'cost-benefit' terms 1 arguing that increoses in American weoponry were justified up to the point where increased expenses for weapons could not be justified in terms of increasing destruction wrought by those weapons in an attack on the Soviet Union.
In 19671 when American strategic forces reached the quantitative targets set by McNamara's cost-benefit anolyses 1 the great expansion leveled off. The United Stetes had a secure secend strike capacity 1 and it was only a matter of time before t he Soviet Union developed the some capacity as weil .
Since increases in weapons could not alter these facts, the stage was set for negotiation of bi-lateral arms control agreements.
In the years preceding the SAL T I agreements, a number of American scholars attempted to analyze the East-West confrontation in terms of the mathematical theory of games, invented by John von Neumann in 1923. One importont gome theoretical distinction is thot between games in whieh gains for one player are counted as Iosses for another ('strictly competitive' or 'zero sum' games) and games in which gains for one player are not necessarily Iosses for the other ('partially cooperative' or 'variable sum' gomes). The study of zero sum games had already proved itself fruitfu l in the study of convoy formations in World War II. In the Cold War years immediately following World War II , it was comman for observers to analyze Eost-West relations in zero sum terms, lnferring that onything good for the Soviet Union must necessorily be evil for the United stetes (a hobit revived by analysts in the Reagan administration). In the lote 1950's a number of game theorists noted that the United Stetes and the Soviet Union were not engaged in total war and that it might be better to analyze East-West relations in variable sum rather than zero sum terms.
Two variable-sum gomes that proved useful in onalyzing nuclear iss ues are 'Chieken' and 'Prlsoner's Dilemma'.
'Chieken' is nomed for a game in which each ployer speeds his automobile head-on towords the other player's car. The first player to swerve to safety is humiliated and called 'chieken'. Chicken is thought by many to represent the structure of nuclear deterrence, in which nuclear nations opproach each other and make nuclear threats, the implementation of whlch both sides would regret. ( The implied American threats du ring the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962 a r e thought to have this character.) The sad fact obout Chicken ls that it seems to reward irrationality: the player who refuses to swerve, or who ties down the steer ing wheel so that he cannot swerve, always wins out over the reasonoble ployer that swerves awoy from danger. Some theorists, taking the chieken anology seriously, argued thot successful Amerlcan deterrence required that the United Stetes adopt actual or seemingly ir r a t ional postures towards the Soviet Union. Such suggestions, popular in the strategie community, never caught hold among Ameriean military Ieaders. And outside the strategie community there were many who argued that the marolly oppropriate action is not to win the Chicken game but to ovoid playing it.
A 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is a variable sum gome in whieh each of two players faces o choiee between two options (call them option C and option D) ond four Outcomes (DC, CC, DD, CD) such that eoch ployer prefers DC to CC, CC to DD, and DD to CD (where the fi r st member of eoch pair represents the first player's choice, the second his opponent's choice). Given these preferences, it is better for both choose C than if both choose D, but better for each if he chooses D, regordless of whot :he other does. i n orms roce situotions when each nation con duplicote the orms ocquisitions of the other, eoch nation would prefer to disarm rother thon orm, but eoch nation would prefer to orm regordless of whot the other does. (Eoch notion wonts to be ormed if the other orms, for purposes of defense, and wonts to be ormed if the other is disormed, to be s trong ot the borgoining toble.) Thus orms races ore Prisoner's Dilemmas: both notions ore better off if they manage to cooperote, but eoch is tempted to orm ond exploit ony tendencies to cooperotion exhibited by the other side.
To stop the nucleor orms race is to solve o Prisoner 's Dilemma. But if eoch player is rational, in the sense of trying to moximize the sotisfoction of his interests, there is on irresistoble orgument for ocquiring orms. Work on the Prisoner's Dilemma in the early ond middle 1960's seemed to find no woy out of t he imposse. But those who developed orguments on morol principles pointed out thot on weil known morol grounds, we should do unto others whot we wish them to do unto us. By thot principle, the correct choice in the Prlsoner's dllemmo is C, not D; in on orms roce, disorm, not orm. 
ABMs ond MIR V s
Once the Minutemon ond Polocis forces hod reoched target Ievels, McNamoro set out to convince the American , public that na further increases in strategic weapon systems were necessory. In o number of well-known public oddresses, McNomo ro noted thot Americon missile sllos were hordened ond American nucleor submarines were invulneroble. Should the Soviet Union, Pearl-Harbor s t yle, lounch oll of its strategic weopons in a surprise attock an the United Stotes, enough American strategic weopons would survive to destroy one quorter of the Saviet population and one holf of its industry. To some ob servers, McNamara's remarks on destroying one quarter of the Sovlet ,populatlon were lndlcatlons t hat the government had chosen to abandon the Flexible Response policy of 1962 and had somehow returned to the policy of Massive Retaliatlon. Others thought that McNamara was mentioning the destr uctlon of ane quarter of the Sovlet populatlon not as part of 'action policy', l.e., military plans, but as part of 'force acquisitlon policy'. ( The Pentagon distlnguishes four defense policles: action policy, acq uisltlon policy, arms cantrol policy, and declaratory policy, i.e. what t he public ls told about the other three policies. lt ls indicatlve of Amerlcan technlcal genlus that t hese four policies rarely coincide.) The truth ls that McNamara was lndeed referring to actlon policy, but only that part of actlon policy thot would be lmplemented in the case of an oll out Sovlet attock on t he United Stetes. McNomara's later speeches represented such o strlklng turnaraund from his earlie r public presentations that commentators gave a new name to Amerlcan st rateglc policy from 1968 to 1974: Assured Des tructlon.
The McNamaro Iimits on strotegic forces did not slt weil wlth the armed services, especlally the Air Force, who we r e partlcularly lnfurlated by McNomaro's decision no to proceed wlth a new stroteglc bomber to replace the B-52. As technical posslbllities lnexorably presented themselves in the 60's, the armed services represented each Innovation os nece ssary for national secu rlt y. Two partlcularl y contraver sial Innovations were an tlballlstic mlssiles, or ABMs, and Multiple lndependently Targeted Re-Entry vehicle s, or MlRVs. (The ABM is a missile deslgned to shoot down on incoming intercontinentol ballistic missile. MIRVs ore vehicles ottoched to ICBMs or SLBMs such thot hydrogen bombs from a slngle mlssile con be delivered accurotely to widely separated targets.)
The controversy about the ABM was a mixed sclentific ond maral con troversy . The scientific controversy concerned whether or not any ABM could actually succeed in bluntlng an lncomlng missile attock before American eitles wer e destroyed (ossumlng thot the lncomlng ottack was directed at eitles.) No one claimed that oll lncomlng misslies could be struck down; the problem was whether or not enough could be knocked down to make a strotegic difference. Advocates orgued that if o single lncomlng missile was struck down, millians of American lives would be saved . Detractors noted that if a slngle mlssile got post an ABM defense, millians of Americon lives would be lost.
ABM. On the marol scales, odvocates of the ABM orgued that it was morolly proper to try to sove Amer lcon lives from Soviet weopons, thot threotenlng the Soviet populotion with secend s trlkes was lmmoral lf an alternative method for protecting the American population was available, and thot the traditional theory of just war sanctloned defensive meosures, like ABM, over offensive Innovations li ke ICBMs. Detractors orgued that the moral advantages of defense could only sanction defenses that actually worked, and that ABM diverted money from legitimote social causes. But the most important moral argument advanced against the ABM was that the best guarantee of peace was the ability of each slde to retaliate decisively in the event of a first strike. Since an American ABM would erode Soviet capacity to deliver a retoliatory strike, the ABM threatened the stable peace-through-deterrence that was ernerging in the lote 1960's.
Despite the problems, the Soviets in 1967 set about constructing an ABM system araund Moscow. Since in the United States it is never politically permlssible for the Soviets to have anything that the United Stetes does not have, Lyndon Johnson in the end decided wlth a smoll ABM, for the purpose, according to an announcement that stupefied the critics, of blocking incomlng Chinese ICBMs! MIR V. The decision to construct an ABM provoked a nationwide public debate. The decision to instoll MIRVs on American missiles, a far more serious armoments decision, was debated only among specialists.
Advocates of MIRV argued that the time that these great increases in American nuclear warheads did not threaten the Soviet Union with an Americon first strike. Soviet submarines remoined invulnerable, enabling the Soviets to inflict great damoge on the United Stetes despite the best American efforts to wipe out Soviet strategic weapons in an American first strike. ( lnterestingly, mony of the odvocates of MIRV were the flrst to argue, six years later, that the deployment of Soviet MIRVs did pose a threat of a Soviet flrst strike against the United St ates.) But the Installation of MIRV would allow for more sophisticated war plons, ond would keep the United Stetes oheod of the Soviet Union, and therefore in o position to not be bullied by Soviet power.
Those who opposed MIRV argued that the Installation of MIRVs upset the strotegic balonce so expensively arrived ot by the lote 1960's. lf a missile carries MIRVs, then one missile con destroy mony missiles, ond an American sneak attack might wipe out the bulk of the Sovlets' long range missile force. Anologously, when the Soviets got araund to instolling their own MIRVs, Americon lang ronge missile forces, at least those placed based on land, would be ot peril. Thus, the threat posed by MIRVs would encouroge eoch side to seek out and destroy enemy MIRVs before being ossoulted by them, ond would pressure each side to fire off its own MIRVs before they ore destroyed on the ground. In short, MIRV was 'destabilizing', provoklng an arms race and increosing the risk of nucleor war. For the detractors of MIRV, nucleor peoce was the highest gool, and strotegic stability, without MIR V, was the shortest rood to peoce. 
The 70's, ond SAL T
In the eorly 1970's, Americon thought obout nucleor weopons was pushed in two controdictory directions. On the one hond, the development of greot nucleor submarine fleets on both sides mode it cleor thot eoch side would mointoin second strike copocity for mony yeors to come. Further purchoses of weopons could not alter this foct, ond fur t her purchoses could not buy strotegic superiority. ( "Whot in the nome of God is strotegic superiority?" Henry Kissinger remorked ot o p r ess conference in 1973, "Whot con you do with it?") Thus the United Stetes ond the Soviet Union hod every reoson to negotiote limitotions on the growth of offensive forces, ond these negotiotions begon in 1969. On the other hond, the Flexible Response doctrine required thot the United Stotes torget Soviet nucleor ond conventionol militory for ces, ond os Soviet passive defenses grew better, Flexible Response required more ond more sophisticoted weoponry on the Americon side. The result of these two controry pressureswas (1) an ogreement to Iimit offensive forces, coupled with o Iimitation on ABM systems so thot strotegie offen ses could continue to over come ony strotegie defense (SALT I ond the ABM Limitation treoty, signed 1972), ond (2) o rapid qualitative improvement of American strotegic systems, consistent with the launeher limitations imposed by SAL T. ( 1) resulted from the search for strotegic stobility and the desire to escape the Prisoner's Dilemma of the nucleo r orms roce. (2) resulted from the putative strotegic and morol advantages of Flexible Response.
The odvontages of the SAL T and ABM treaties were so manifest to the majority of Americans that few genuine orguments were roised ogoinst it in the United Stotes. The Americon rig ht wing complained bitterly that the Soviets, in ploin numbers, were olloted more strategic launchers than the United States, but in fact the United States gave up nothing that it was plonning to build, ond whatever numericol advontoges the Soviets hod in launchers were concelled out by tremendous American preponderance in strategic bomber s. By agreeing to Iimit ABMs, the United Stotes stopped spending on a system that would probobly never work.
Had the superpowers escaped the force of the Prisoner's Dilemma? Moralists said the problern had been overcome by the development of trust between the superpowers, ond that the development of mutual trust signified a morol advance in international relations. But the American right objected thot ony agreement based on tr usting t he Soviet s was bound to be subverted and bound to be bad for the United Stotes . lf the race in strotegic arms were o Prisoner's Dilemma, then the feors of the right were not completely irrational, since porties thot cooperote in a Prisoner's Dilemma feel great pressure to defect from cooperation before the other porty defects. In an onolysis published by the present author in 1975, I s uggest thot the obility of the superpowers to sign ond s tick to the provisions of SAL T I is proof thot by 1972 the nucleor or ms roce hod ceosed to be o Prisoner's Dilemma. In o genuine Prisoner's Dilemma, when two porties are Co-operating, the benefits of unilateral defection ( ta the defector) are greoter thon the benefits to eoch of mutual coo perotion , while the penaity of being the second to defect is worse thon the penolty for mutual noncooperation. In 1972, the advontages of defecting from cooperation (bu ilding more offensive missile launchers, building an ABM before the other side does) were in foct less thon the benefits of mutual cooperotion, while the penolty for being second to defect (not hoving os mony missiles thon the opponent, not hoving an ABM when the opponent hos one) were in foct less than the penalties to both if both built more ABMs and more offensive missiles. (1) The new SIOP gove the President o for greoter ronge of ottock options thon the McNomoro S IOP. · In porticolor, the new S IOP ollowed the Presidef\t. to1 loo.m:h <l smoll strike in response to o smoll strike, something not eosJ!y done wHI) the l 9Q2 plan. These smoll strikes were called 'limited nuclear Op tions', ol' lNOG, (2} In the event of o !arge scole nucleor exchonge between the United Stotes ond the Soviet Union, insteod of the oll-out 'sposm' ottock described in the McNomoro SIOP, the new war plan colled for qn ottock intended "to destroy the Soviet Union os o 20th century soeiety". Targets were chosen with the intent of destroying the entire industriol ond economic bose of the Soviet Union. Though tens of millians of persons would die in such an ottock, mony fewer people would be killed by such an ottock thon the number of people in the Soviet Union who would be killed if the United Stotes chose an ottock plan intended to moximize deoth ond destruction.
(3) Cities ond certoin commond ond control centers ore ploced -so the sources soy -"on withhold". It is difficult to interpret whot the words "on withhold" meon. Since the phrose is new, it implies that there is some extra meosure of protection given to eitles in the 1974 SIOP thot was not present in the 1962 SIOP. An optimistic Interpretation might be that, in the event of o nucleor war, no Americon nucleor weopons will land on Soviet eitles unless some speeiol, extroordinory commond is issued by the President ond the Secretory of Defense. On the other hond, o more pessimistic Interpretation might be thot "ploeing eitles on withhold" meons merely thot no Americon nucleor weopons will fall on Soviet eitles unless it is oimed ot some militory or industriol torget within the city.
The trend to Counterforce estoblished in the 1974 SIOP continues down to the present, guiding the thought of Amerieon war plonners despite the deep differences in attitude towords defense issues exhibited by Presidents Ford, Carter and Reogon. President Ford sonctioned the new SIOP in 1974. Pursuing the counterforce trend, the Corter odministrotion improved the occurocy and force of the Minutemon worheod, supported the development of the MX missile, (o land bosed ICBM intended to reploce a !arge port of the Minutemon force) ond pursued the development of the Trident submarine, a submarine intended to reploce the Poseiden ond one whieh would eventuolly corry the powerful ond occurote D-5 missile. In deeisions the signifieance of which was little grosped ot the time, Corter vigorously endorsed the development of three sorts of cruise missiles, ond sonctioned o new intermediate ronge missile, the Pershing II. 8oth the cruise ond the Pershing II hod 'terroin-countour-motching' guidonce systems which mode them the most occurote of oll Amerieon strotegie lounchers.
One woy to grosp the import of the new Americon strotegic systems is to consider the 'k-foctors' of the new generotion of weopons. The 'k -foctor' is an index which indicotes the obility of o strotegie weopon to destroy o hordened torget, like an ICBM missile silo. (Mothemotically, the k -foctor is the horizontal explosive force of the missile divided by the squore of the missile's accurocy.) The k -foctor of the Minutemon 111 is 34; the k -foctor of its successor, the MX is 204; the k-foctor of the Poseiden C-3 is 2; the k-foctor of its successor, the D-5, is 24. The k -foctor of the cruise missile end the Pershing II is opproximotely 1,300. Since the bulk of Soviet s trotegic weopons were in land-bosed ICBMs in fixed locations, and since the Americons, by 1980, had the ability to locate and track the majority of Soviet s t rotegic submarines, the new Ame rlcan weopons systems gave the President of the United Stetes the ability to destroy o substontiol percentage of Soviet strotegic weapons, should he choose to lounc h a massive nucleor fi r st strike.
The Corter odministration consolidated oll of these developments in o nucleor war plan described in Pr esidential Directive 59 (PD-59), i ssued 25 July 1980. PD-59 gave President iol blessing to the concepts of counterforce targeting end limited nuclear options. But the new direct ive not only required that the United Stetes hove o specific nucleor response for each oct of Soviet aggression, it also required that the United Stetes have sufficient weoponry to prevoil ot eoch Ievel of violence in possible nucleor war. This new requirement, colled Escolation Dominonce, was allegedly designed to improve American deterrence. Reogon endorsed end funded oll the strotegic programs supported by Carter -the Trident, the MX, the Pershing II end the three types of cr uise misslies -and revived the B-1 bornher, the one strotegic weopons progrcm thot Car ter had dropped. l n nuclear strategy, he occepted (or his advisors accepted) the trend to counterforce, the development of limited nuclear options, and the requirement of escalation dominance. But Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Ca spar Weinherger, added one further requirement to the heavy burden of deterrence. Schlesinger had demanded that the United States have a specifie military response to every sort of initial Soviet aggression. Carter had demanded that the United States have a specific reply at every Ievel of violence. Weinherger demanded that the United Stat~s be able to 'prevail' at every stage of a multi-sta. ge nuclear war. For example, if the Soviet Union were losing on day N of an extended nuclear war, they must be persuaded by American weaponry that they have no chance of winning by extending the war to some later day. In October 1981, the Readan administration issued National Security Decision Directive 13 ( NSDD-13), calling for the creation of command and control facilities capable of directing forces in nuclear wars Iasting for as long as sixty days. Needless to say, planning and preparing for a 60 day nuclear war, and developing plans that would give the United States 'victory' in such a war, rather than merely assuring defeat for the Soviet Union, was a complicated process, and attempts to meet the Weinherger specifications required unprecedented increases in military expenditures. The priee tag for the Reagan version of the Countervailing Strategy was $1.5 trillion in the first five years. 
Criticisms of the Countervailing Strotegy
The new Counterforce programs -the MIRVed Minuteman, the MX, the Trident -we r e not without their critics. Some feit that the new systems might improve American deterrence but thot the improvements were not worth the money. Other crltics feit that the new systems were not only expensive but provided the United Stetes with no improvements in deterrence over earlier systems. The most se riou s critics argued that the new progroms substantiall y increased the chance of nuclear war. The following ore typicol criticisms of Counterforce developments and the Countervailing Strategy os they accumuloted from the lo te 1960's.
1. lf o nation's primary goal is the maintenance of secend strike capocity, (i.e. the ability to strike back after riding out a nuclear first strike), then survivobility of strotegic forces is essential. Survivobility can be obtained in three ways: (o) concealment, (b) defense, end (c) dispersion. Now, the MX missile is !arger than the Minutemon ond the Trident submarine is !arger than Poseiden. Hence, given the SAL T limitations on total offensive forces, the MX end Trident programs marked a trend towords concentrotion of force, rot her than dispersion. Su pporters of the Trident program argued t hat the superior diving copacity of the Trident submarine made it easier to conceal; supposedly eoch submarine is more survivable even if the submarine force were smaller. Even if this (somewhat dubious) rationale is occepted for the Trident, finding o corresponding improvement in conceolment for the land based MX missile is difficult. In its final years the Carter administration suggested t hat the MX be housed on railroad cors in long underground tunnels, a r emedy the desperation of which simply highlighted the strotegic deficiencies of the MX. The new Counterforce weopon s were simultoneously threotening ond vulnerable.
2. For mony, the introduction of counterfor ce systems signified thot the United Stotes was more interested in 'winning' nucleor wors thon in preventing them from storting. Critics frequently posed the question: how were the new Counterforce weopons to be used? Were they to be used only to retoliote ogoln st notlon s thot lau nched n ucleor ottock s on the United Stotes? Or were they to be used in preemptlve first strikes by the United Stotes ogoinst its enemies? To mony crltlcs lt seems thot the new Counterforce weopons were more oppropriote to o first strike strotegy thon to o secend strike s trotegy. After oll, the new weopons were relotively more vulnerable, ond vulnerobility is not o problern only if one intends to use the weopons fir st, rother thon second. And whot was the point in the extreme occurocies of the new weopons, ond their 'counterforce' pottern of torgeting, if one intended to strike second? Striking second, the new weopons would crosh on empty missile silos in the Soviet Union. High occurocy ond coun terforce torgeting only moke sense ogoinst occupied missiles silos, ond to strike occupied silos one must strike first.
Whether or not the new weopons were in foct port of an Americon plan for o possible preemptive s trike ogoinst the Soviet Union, they could eosily be perceived o s port of o first strike plan. (lndeed, the introduction, in the mid-1970's 1 of the Soviet SS-18 ond SS -19, which hod 'silo-busting' copocity ogoinst the Americon Minutemon, was widely hoiled by the Americon right os proof positive of Soviet plons for o preemptive nucleor strike ogoinst the United Stotes.) The obvious woy for the Soviets to protect their weopons ogoinst such o first strike threot is to set up plons to lounch their missiles before the Americons did. The Soviets could also respond to the new Americon threot by shifting their misslies to o 'lounch on worning' posture, rigging their missiles for lounch os soon os an incoming Americon ottock was identified. In turn, the Americons could respond to the Soviet responses by moking plons to ottock even sooner thon the Soviets, ond by putting their own missiles on 'lounch on worning' stotus. Needless to soy 1 the Soviet responses to the Americon threot ond the American responses to the Soviet responses oll mode nuclear war more likely to occur. This is what the critics have in mind when they say thot counterforce weapons ond counterforce war plans are 'destabilizing'.
Did the United Stetes have a plan for a fir st strike against the Soviet Union? Since one of the features of the Schlesinger SIOP was that it tried to develop 'optlons' for every conceivoble contingency 1 it would be surprising if the SIOP did not contain some plans for a first use of strategic weapons against the Soviet Union. The important question is not whether or not there is a plan for a sneak attack on the Soviet Union, but whot the probability is that the plan would be activated. Given the irrrnense uncertointies involved in such an ottock, we con ossume thot the chonces of octivoting ony first s trlke plan ore slim. At the some time, the development of the MX ond the Trident certoinly mode it more likely thot such o plan might be octivoted.
3. The Countervoiling Strotegy requires thot the United $totes p revoil ot eoch Ievel of violence ond ot eoch stoge in an extended nucleor conflict. But these requirement presuppose thot o nucleor war con be restricted to o given Ievel of violence or o given durotion. There ore, however, mony technicol reosons for believing t hot nucleor war connot be controlled ond connot be limited. In porticulor, it is difficult to control o nucleor war becouse the explosion of nucleor weopons will disrupt corrmunicotions link s between the militory I politicol Ieader ship an d the notion's s t r otegic forces.
And it is difficult to Iimit o nucleor war becouse in o nucleor war limited to o porticulor Ievel of violence, the losing side will olwoys be tempted to retrieve victory from defeot by escoloting to !arger nucleo r weopons ond o higher Ievel of violence .
The Countervoiling Strotegy also ossumes thot if o nucleor war is kept from escoloting to the highest Ievels of violence, the Ievel of destruction will be less thon total. In the eorly 1980's, o number of studies suggested thot the omount of domoge from o 'smoll' nucleor war might be so greot thot the difference between the darnage coused by o smoll nucleor war might opprooch thon expected in o full scole nucleor war. In porticulor, if otomic weopons were torgeted on forest oreos or other ploces ot which otomic explosion s might produce !arge q~ontities of smoke, . the resulting 'nucleor winter' might kill severol billion people, the some number thot the str otegy of Massive Retoliotion might hove produced. 
Star Wars
On 23 March 1983 President Reagan startled the American people and many of his closest advisors with a radieal speech on military policy. Since the lote 1950's, it had been American policy to prevent nuclear attack on the United Stetes through deterrence, that is, through threats of nuclear counterattack. Reagan called for the development of defenses against nuclear attack that would make deterrence unnecessary:
"But since the advent of nuclear weapons, (military policy has) been increasingly directed towards deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliotion. Over the course of these discussions, I have become mare and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major arms reductions we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation .
•. Wouldn't it be better to save Jives than to avenge them? What if a free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of Instant U. S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached ou r own soil or that of ou r allies? I know that this is a formidable technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet current technology has attained a Ievel of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin the effort."
This speech introduced what the American government calls the 'Strategie Defense Initiative' but what everyone else calls the 'Star Wars' program. Though few experts took the program seriously at first, the government has committed several billion dollars a year for the first stages of research, and the program has begun to develop a bureaucracy and momentum of its own. In -addition, several defense experts at key points on the Reagan national defense team are committed to the program with a quasi-religious intensity.
There are three possibilities for the Strategie Defense Initiative: it may turn out that no system can provide any kind of defense, .2!:. thot some· system con provide a partial defense, .2!:. thot some system may provide o complete defense for American cities. Critics of the program find eoch of the three alternatives unfortunote.
Mast scientists believe thot no system can provide ony kind of defense. The Soviets con lounch some 2,000 missiles ond some 7,000 worheads against the United Stotes. There ore at most 30 minutes in whieh these missiles must be struck down . Most 'Star Wors' suggestions plan to direct loser . beams or particle beams ogoinst incoming missiles, but the job of successfully striking down so mony missiles is very diffieult, if not impossible, even under present conditions. But as the Americon Star War program goes forword, the Soviets con ond will respond, and most experts predict that Soviet offense, including more missiles, more bombs, dummy worheads, attacks on satellites, and so forth, will olwoys outrun American defense. Similarly, if the Soviets press forward with o shield program of their own, the United Stotes will seek to over whelm it with on offensive buildup of its own. Thus the most likely result of the ottempt to build strotegic defenses will no real defense but much more offense.
But suppose thot some os yet unknown technique provides t he United Stotes with a partial defense. Then it will not be possible for the United Stotes to sove its eitles if the Soviets strike first, but it might be possible to sove Americon eitles if the United Stotes strikes first, using it s defense system to strike down the few remoining misslies coming over in o Soviet second strike. A portiolly effective defense system, then, would push the United Stotes towards pre-emptive war, ond would pressure the Soviet Union towords pre-emptive war, to "strike fir st before the Americons do". Thus, on Americon defensive system con serve the peoce only if it is completel y effective.
But now suppose thot the Americons develop o completely effective defensive shield. Then the world would return to 1948, when t he United Stotes was in o position to lau nch n ucleor ot tock s without feor of being destroyed by nucleor reprisols. Thot this Situation would not outomoticolly be o blessing for the world might be inferred from the feelings thot Americons would experience if the Soviet Union developed such o shield when the United Stotes hod none. These melancholy reflections on even o 'perfect' shield ore not lightened by the reolizotion thot no shield could remoin impenotroble for ever. When the doy orrives thot the Americon shield become penotroble, when the American public suddenly finds itself tronsported from o situotion of complete security to o situotion of complete insecurity, rectifioble only by o pre-emptive ottock on suddenly th r eatening enemy nucleor weapons, ond when the Soviets recognize thot the Uni t ed Stotes ond its government feels this woy, then the chonces of war may be higher than they were whe n the United Stotes hod no shield ot oll.
The Philosopher's Debote on Nuclear Weapons
Philosop her s in the United $totes, even those speciolizin g in political p hilosophy and ethics, w,ere not deeply involved in the initiol debates about nuclear weapons policy. While their British colleagues in the lote 50's published copiously on morality and nuclear weapons, the American moral debate in the 50's and 60's was conducted by persans working from an essentially religious orientation, not persans rooted in philosophical ethics. Their discussions were dominated by the traditional cotegories of religious ethics and moral theology, including the just war t r adition.
lf there was a common theme in these early American discussions, it was the moral unacceptability of directing attacks on 'enemy' civilians in order to influence the decisions of enemy governments -the sort of policy the United States undertook in its bombing of Japanese cities in World War II. For some, the irrmorolity of terror bombing implied the irrmorality of threats of terror bombing, thot is, the irrmorality of adopting o policy of planning to retaliate ogoinst enemy cities in response to an attack on the United States. Some suggested that this result implied that the United States should forswear the use of nuclear weapons. Others suggested that this orgument condemned the threat to retaliate against enemy cities but did not condemn retaliation against enemy military installations, even if such attacks killed mony civilians as weil as destroying the military targets that were di r ect objects of attock.
In the lote 60's ond early 70's, the attention of American philosophers focused on issues arising from the war in Vietnam, and the nuclear problern was largely left to specialists. Two exceptions to this neglect were Douglas Lackey's article Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence, ( 1975) and Gregory Kavka's article Same Paradoxes of Deterrence ( 1978.) . Lackey argued that the policy of deterring n uclear ottacks with threats of nuclear counterattack was not acceptable becau se it req uired the u se of per son s -presumably persans in the U.S.S.R. -as means to an end (contrary to Kantian ethics), and because it posed an unacceptably high Ievel of danger to persans living in nonaligned nations. Kovko, in his article, orgued that it was morally permissible to threaten to do what it would be irrmoral to do, provided that one does not carry out the threat and provided that the consequences of making the threot are morally good. In a later article, (Deterrence, Utility, and Rational Choice, 1980) Kavka went on to argue that nuclear threats were morally justifiable on these grounds: they have not been corried out, and so for they hove hod the good effect of preventing nucleor attacks on the United States and helping to Iimit Soviet power in the world.
Though these two articles are now fairly weil known, they were largely neglected ot the time. The moral debate began in earnest only with the election of President Reogon in 1980. Reagon's policies os regords nucleor weapons were lorgely inherited from Jirrrny Corter, but Corter's policies, combined with Reagan's irrepressibly hostile ottitude towards the Soviet Union, mode it seem to many thot nucleor war was irrrninent. Mony philosophers begon publishing obout nuclear war ond nuclear deterrence, basing their analyses on the prevailing moral systems discussed by American philosophers, especially utilitarianism, morol rights theory, ond the theory of justice. Three nuclear weapons policies were especially deboted: nonpossession (i.e. unilateral nuclear disarmament in the case of nuclear stetes), finite deterrence (i.e. use of nuclear threots only to deter nuclear attack) and extended deterrence (i . e. use of nuclear threats to prevent aggression, whether nuclear or non -nuclear). If the three moral theories are used to assess each of the three policies, there are nine distinct ques t ions about nuclear ethics, and American philosophers have surveyed oll nine of them.
Utilitarian marol philosophers concerned themselves with deciding which nuclear weapons policy best serves the common good of monkind. In 1982, in a widely read book, Jonathan Schell argued that nuclear deterrence did not serve the common good, since nuclear deterrence risked nuclear war, and nuclear war risked the annihilotion of the human species, a result Schell judged to be infinitely bad. Schell's argument, however, made little Impression on American philosophers even utilitarian philosophers -becouse Schell failed to demanstrete (a) that nuclear deterrence was not the best available mean s of preventing nuclear war, ( b) that nuclear war, if it occurred, could indeed destroy the human species, (c) that the extinction of the human species should be considered infinitely bad and (d) that oll chances of human extinction must also be considered infinitely bad, even if the chances ore in fact q uite smoll .
In 1982, Douglas Lackey provided a different utilitarian argument against nuclear deterrence, whether finite or extended. Lackey argued that nonpossession served the common good best, since the number of people who might be killed in a Soviet attack on the United Stetes, given an Americon choice of non -possession, would be less than the number of people who might be killed in a war between the superpowers, given an American choice of either finite deterrence or extended deterrence. Lackey's arguments were attocked by Gregory Kavka, who argued that the common good consists of more than simply lives lost or lives soved, and by Russell Hordin, who argued that unilateral disarmoment precluced bi-laterial disarmoment, and that attempts ot bi-lateral disarmament were not only better for the common good but also within the realm of political possibility, as unilaterial nuclear disarmament is not. Among deterrent policies, Kavka and Hardin both leaned towards finite deterrence. Arguments that extended deterrence serves the common good best were produced by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in a speech in 1982.
For those phllosophers for whom human rights is the primory morol concern, the debote obout nucleor weopons policies hos revolved araund the right to self-defense versus t he right of persans not to be subjected to nucleor risks. For some, the right to self-defense obviously ju s tifies both finite ond extended Americon deterrence. Others note thot the right to self-detense is usuolly construed os o right to use violence ogoinst oggressors ond only ogoinst oggressors. lf so, it is difficult do justify nucleor deterence one grounds of self defense, since deterrence inflicts risk s on innocent nonoggressors os weil os oggressors.
Whot obout the risks inflicted by Americon nucleor systems on other notions, especiolly nonnucleor notions? For some, the mognitude ond type of these r isks, -in effect, Americon nucleor systems hold the Soviet people os hostoges -p r ove thot ony policy of deterrence is morolly intolerable. For others, the quontity of risk inflicted by finite deterrence is morolly tolerable. As for the 'hostoge holding' issue, supporters of deterrence note thot the United Stotes con be occused of holding the whole world hostoge only if it directs its nucleor weopons ot enemy (i.e. Soviet) eitles. lf it directs its retoliotory forces ot enemy militory instollotions, then the deoths of civllions would be foreseen but unintended consequences of legitimote militory operotions, justifioble by the lows of war ond by the troditionol doctrine of morol theology colled "the doctrlne of double effect".
There hos been consideroble discussion omong Americon philosophers obout the relationship between nucleor weopons policies ond concepts of justice. For some, jus tice consists in foirness ond foirness in reciprocity. On this view, if the Soviet Union imposes o risk of nucleor ottock on the United Stotes, then it is fair for the United Stotes to impose o risk of nucleo r ottock on the Soviet Union. Other philosophers turn this orgument araund ond note thot sinc~ nonnucleor countries do not impose o risk of nucleor war on the United Stotes, it is not fair for the United $totes to impose the risks of nucleor war on them.
For other philosophers, the notion of justice is closely linked not to reciprocity but to rotionolity. For these onolysts, the debote centers on the rotionolity of nucleor deterrence. Con it be rational to ottempt to p r event nucleor war with threots of nucleor reprisols? Different philosophers answer in different woys. Same orgue thot since it is irrational to engoge in nucleor war, it must be irrational to moke nucleor threots. For these philosophers, deterrence is irrational. Others orgue thot since it is rational to moke nucleor threots (ot least threots designed to prevent nucleor ottocks) it must also be rational to engoge in nucleor war. For such thin ke r s, deterrence is rational. Still others orgue thot there is no relationship whotsoever between the rotionolity of nucleor threots ond the rationality of actually carrying out those threats. For them deterrence may be rational even if nuclear strikes are never rational.
In addition to studies of the rationality of deterrence, philosophers have been involved in studying the rationality of the arms race, once again confronting the problern of the Prisoners' Dilemma. Work in this area has been stimulated by studies af the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma conducted by Robert Axelrod in 1981, the results af which seem to imply, in the case of arms race, that the rational course of action in a world of multiple nuclear powers is (a) never to be the first to increase nuclear armaments, and (b) always to increase armaments (or take some other punitive action) if the other side does. More recently, some attentian has been given to a theoretical result derived by Professor Steven Broms, showing that nations trapped in a Prisaner's Dilemma that prevents them from achieving arms control can extricate themselves by improving their ability to predict each others actions, improvements that can be obtained without prior COoperation with better signal intelligence, surveillance satellites, and so forth.
Finally, there are those philosophers for whom the principles of justice are the principles that parties arrive at through a process of negotiation and agreement. For these 'Social Contract' theorists, the just nuclear policy is a policy that nations would arrive at if they began from a position of eq uality an d negotiated rationally. Some philosapher s believe that nation s starting from a position of equality would agree not to possess nuclear weapons at oll. Others argue that the social contract theory s u pports deterrence -at least finite deterrence. Still other philosophers maintain that since the superpowers cannot reach an agreement, the principles of justice simply cannot be applied to their relations, and that therefore considerations of national interest should determine the choice of policies. lt is clear from these remarks that American philosophers have not invented any new nuclear weapons policies, nor have they devised any new moral theories with which to judge them. lnstead the philosophers have provided new arguments for and against each of the three moin palicy aptians: nonpassessian, finite deterrence, and extended deterrence. Though many different philosophical and moral positions are represented, it seems that not many philosophers argue for the moral necessity of nonpossession or for the moral permissibility of extended deterrence. The majority seem to support finite deterrence: the retention of a minimum number of nuclear weapans in order ta deter, and only to deter, nuclear attacks on American eitles. Since present American palicy is a palicy of nonminimum extended deterrence, the majority of American philosophers believe that morality demands substantial changes in the defense policies of the 
